April 2012
In This Issue:
Zoning Ordinance Doesn't Trump Restrictive Covenant
Owner Owes Assessments on Realloted Common Areas
Assessment Liability Starts On Date of Foreclosure Sale
Parking Policy Doesn’t Violate Fair Housing Act
Challenge to Bylaws Amendment Barred After One Year
Declarant Can Collect Assessment for HOA’s Legal Costs
Sales Agreement Without Property Description Revocable
Mortgage Lien Superior to Lien for Unpaid Assessments
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Zoning Ordinance Doesn't Trump Restrictive Covenant

Benjamin Crossing Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Heide, No. 79A04-1103-PL-185, Ind. App. Ct., Feb. 7, 2012

Covenants Enforcement/State and Local Legislation and Regulations: An Indiana appeals court ruled that restrictive covenants prohibited the use of lots for daycare businesses.

Benjamin Crossing Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (association) is a planned unit development in Tippecanoe County, Ind. The association’s declaration allows the subdivision lots to be used for residential purposes only. The Tippecanoe Area Plan Commission gave final approval for the subdivision and approved the declaration in 2003.

In May 2003, Rose Heide purchased a home in the association. She lives in the residence, and in June 2008, she began operating a licensed child care center in her home. David Wilkerson purchased a home in the association in February 2008. In March 2008, he and his wife began operating a licensed child care center in their residence as well.

In October 2008, Heide and Wilkerson sued the association, claiming that the association couldn’t enforce the restrictive covenant that bans non-residential use of lots because Indiana law prohibits zoning ordinances that prevent the operation of a child care centers in a residential home. The association moved to dismiss the action and filed a counterclaim, seeking to prohibit Heide and Wilkerson from operating their child care centers in their homes.

The trial court dismissed the homeowners’ action on the ground that Indiana law permits restrictive covenants that don’t allow business operations within the development.

In January 2010, the association moved for summary judgment (a determination made by a court without a full trial) on its counterclaim, and the court reversed its prior decision to dismiss the homeowner’s claims. It found instead that “the restrictive covenants of a planned unit development have the status of a zoning ordinance, and a zoning ordinance may not exclude the operation of a licensed child care home in the operator’s residence.” The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Heide and Wilkerson on the counterclaim. The association appealed.

The association argued that the trial court erred when it concluded that the restrictive covenants could be treated as a zoning ordinance. The appeals court agreed that the planned unit development ordinance (the zoning regulations of a geographical area) had no effect on the association’s authority to enforce the private restrictive covenant.

The appeals court held that zoning ordinances and laws cannot exempt real estate from being subject to valid private restrictive covenants. The court further stated that zoning regulations and private restrictions do not affect each other. The zoning restrictions imposed upon a property owner’s land are obligations to the community. The private covenants are an obligation to a private party that may or may not be enforceable, but which cannot, in any event, affect the development from conforming to the planned unit development ordinance.

The trial court reasoned that when the declaration was incorporated in the planned unit development ordinance, the restrictive covenants in the declaration acquired the status of a zoning ordinance. However, the appeals court determined that this conclusion was contrary to law. The appeals court held that restrictive covenants are agreements between private parties and are enforceable by those parties. Zoning ordinances, such as those at issue, arise from the government exercising its power to enforce rules and have no effect on restrictive covenants.

Indiana law restricts a municipality’s authority when enacting or enforcing a zoning ordinance. Prohibiting a zoning ordinance that bans the operation of a child care center in a residence is directed at the municipality, and renders any such ordinance unenforceable by the municipality. On the other hand, the restrictive covenant in the declaration sets out the mutual obligations and rights of property owners to each other. The court found that the restrictive covenants were enforceable by the association, and they were not nullified by the adoption of the planned unit development ordinance that included prohibiting the ban of home-based child care centers.

The appeals court concluded that the trial court erred by ruling that the association was prohibited from enforcing the restrictive covenant banning the operation of businesses in residences located in Benjamin Crossing, as well as when it granted summary judgment in favor of Heide and Wilkerson.

The trial court’s decision in favor of Heide and Wilkerson was reversed and the case remanded (sent back to a lower court) with instructions that judgment be entered in the association’s favor.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

Owner Owes Assessments on Realloted Common Areas

Board of Managers of The Greene House Condominium v. Nahoum, No. 114514/10, N. Y. Supr. Ct., Jan. 23, 2012

Assessments: A New York supreme court ruled that a condominium board of managers was entitled to foreclose its lien for unpaid assessments, finding that a reduction in the unit owner’s interest in the common areas did not relieve him from his obligation to pay common charges.

Kenneth Nahoum purchased four of the 30 residential units in the Greene House Condominium, located in New York City. In 2002, he made extensive renovations to combine three of his units into one. As part of the renovation process, he entered into an agreement with the Board of Managers of The Greene House Condominium (board) whereby he acquired approximately 1000 square feet of additional common area. During the renovation period, a dispute arose between Nahoum and the board concerning this ownership and use of the common area.  

The dispute was ultimately resolved, and a settlement was reached in 2008. Under the settlement, Nahoum agreed to relinquish 306 square feet of roof space and 744 square feet of mechanical space he had acquired in 2002. No reapportionment of the common charges assessed against Nahoum’s units was made in the settlement agreement.

Discord over the common charges escalated between Nahoum and the board. Nahoum began withholding monthly common charge payments, and the board sued to enforce its assessment lien and collect the delinquent amounts.

In 2011, following a unanimous vote of the board and approval by the unit owners, an amendment to the bylaws was adopted to deal with common charge delinquencies. The amendment authorized disciplinary actions against unit owners who were more than 60 days delinquent.

Adopted collection methods included restricting the unit owner’s access to building services and amenities; deactivating any elevator keycards except those providing access to his unit; and posting the name, unit number, photograph, and overdue balance of the owner in the building lobby. The amendment also prohibited serious delinquents from serving on the board; voting at annual or special meetings; and from making structural additions, alterations or improvements to their units.

Nahoum argued that the board breached the good faith and fair dealing covenant because it did not recalculate his common charges to reflect the reduction in his interest of the common areas, and he continued withholding common charge payments. The board deactivated his elevator key card and posted his photograph and information about the outstanding debt in the elevator and lobby.

Nahoum sued the board, seeking a declaration that it must recalculate the common charges assessed against him to be consistent with his relinquishment of the common area in 2008, as well as a declaration stating the bylaws amendment that authorized the board’s collection measures was invalid and unenforceable. He demanded the court penalize the board for denying him use of the elevator and posting his photograph in the building.

The board submitted unrefuted proof to the court showing that Nahoum owned the units at all relevant times; that he agreed when he purchased his units to abide by the declaration and bylaws; that he was required to pay common charges assessed by the board; that he had failed to pay the common charges and late fees since August 2010; and, pursuant to the New York condominium statute, that the board had an automatic lien on the units for the unpaid amounts.

Nahoum did not dispute the board’s evidence or significantly challenge its authority to foreclose it liens. Rather, he opposed the board’s motion for summary judgment (a determination made by a court without a full trial) on the ground that questions of material fact (relevant evidence to a case) existed as to whether the board breached the good faith and fair dealing covenant by failing to recalculate the common charges to reflect his reduced interest in his units following his post-settlement relinquishment of common area.

The court found that the settlement documents did not reveal that the board intended to adjust the common charges, and conspicuously absent from the documents was any evidence that the common charges had been increased when Nahoum acquired the additional common area in 2002.

Nahoum’s units constituted approximately 18 percent of the condominium’s total common interest, and his failure to pay his past due and current charges had a severe impact on the condominium’s operating budget.

Nahoum failed to raise a question of fact (a disputed issue that must be resolved by a jury because it’s not clearly covered by any law) regarding any information submitted to the court by the board, and he failed to produce any competent evidence to support his defense. Therefore, the court ruled in the board’s favor and awarded attorney’s fees and related collection costs.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Assessment Liability Starts On Date of Foreclosure Sale

Campbell v. Council of Unit Owners of Bayside Condominium, No. 1187, Md. App. Ct., Dec. 1, 2011

Assessments: A condominium unit purchased at a foreclosure sale is subject to regular and special assessments as of the date of sale and thereafter.

Elizabeth Campbell purchased a unit in Bayside Condominium, located in Chester, Md., at a foreclosure sale conducted on Aug. 3, 2009. The terms of sale provided that adjustments on all taxes, public charges and special and regular assessments would be assumed by the purchaser starting on the date of sale. The circuit court approved the sale on Nov. 25, 2009, the sale was closed on Dec. 28, 2009, and the deed was recorded on Jan. 7, 2010.

Campbell did not pay the condominium fees that had accrued from the date of sale, but instead paid only those due from the date of closing forward. As a result, the Council of Unit Owners of Bayside Condominium (council) notified her of its intent to foreclose its assessment lien. In March 2010, Campbell sued the council, seeking to deny the lien. The trial court ruled in the council’s favor, and Campbell appealed.

Campbell maintained that her liability for paying assessments was governed and limited by the Maryland Condominium Act, which provides that “A unit owner shall be liable for all assessments, or installments thereof, coming due while he is the owner of a unit.” She contended that because she did not acquire title until Dec. 28, 2009, the date the deed was executed, she was not the owner of the property until that date, and thus, not liable for assessments prior to that date.

The council maintained that Campbell, as a foreclosure purchaser, obtained equitable title (when a purchaser assumes ownership of a property even though the sale has not yet finalized) upon approval of the sale, and therefore assumed responsibilities for assessments as of that date.

The appeals court relied on Maryland case law to determine that the purchaser of a foreclosure sale property is in a unique position because of the particular nature of those transactions. The court concluded that from the date of sale, Campbell was the equitable owner of the property, with the benefits of that ownership balanced by the obligations of ownership during the interval. The court also observed that a foreclosure purchaser bears risk of property (the possibility of financial loss occurring as the result of owing a piece of property) upon her bid and should act to protect the equitable interest she receives following the foreclosure sale.

The court found that Campbell was liable for assessments from the date of the foreclosure sale forward, and noted that its ruling did not breach the Maryland Condominium Act because it did not detract from the ordinary definition of “owner.” Although the act defines “unit owner” as a person holding legal title, nevertheless, the term embraces a holder of equitable title whose rights are virtually ironclad, so long as she fulfills her obligations under the terms of the foreclosure sale. Therefore, the trial court ruling was correct.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Parking Policy Doesn’t Violate Fair Housing Act

Edwards v. Lake Terrace Condominium Association, No. 1:10-cv-2986, U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. Ill., April 21, 2011

Federal Law and Legislation: A condominium association’s suspension of the valet parking services it provided to residents did not violate the Fair Housing Act because it applied equally to all residents and did not make the property unfit for occupancy.

Manus Edwards lives at the Lake Terrace Apartment complex in Chicago, Ill. Residents include both renters and unit owners. While 75 percent of the unit owners are Caucasian, most of them rent their units to African American tenants. The remaining 25 percent of condominium owners are African Americans who live in their units.

Lake Terrace Condominium Association (association) manages the 356-unit complex. The building has a parking facility on the premises, which has 280 parking spaces. When Edwards moved in, a part self-parking, part valet parking system had been in place for 35 years. In April 2010, following a vote by its board of directors, the association informed residents that it would no longer provide valet parking and that residents would have to park their cars themselves.

Edwards—an African American over the age of 40—sued the association, alleging that the new parking system violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating against him on the basis of race and age. The association moved to dismiss the action on the ground that Edwards failed to state a claim for relief (the plaintiff’s request for a remedy from the defendant if the plaintiff’s allegations prove true) under the act.

The court noted that Edwards did not clearly identify which provisions of the act had been violated by the association. The act is concerned with both furthering equal housing opportunities and eliminating segregated housing. It is unlawful to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. It is also unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling, or to discriminate against any person in the provision of services or facilities offered by the association or landlord, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. It is unlawful to discriminate against or deny any buyer or renter because of a disability. It is also unlawful to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodation is necessary for the person with the disability to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. However, Edwards failed to state a claim for violation of any of the foregoing provisions, both because he did not allege that he suffered an injury and because he failed to show that the association acted with discriminatory intent.

The only claim that a renter or owner can bring under the act for post-acquisition discrimination is one of constructive eviction (when a landlord does not actually evict a tenant but does something that renders the premises uninhabitable in order to force the tenant out) or conduct after a dwelling is purchased that makes it unavailable to the owner or tenant. The act does not protect those intangible interests in the already-owned property that were raised in Edward’s complaint. Furthermore, constructive eviction requires a surrender of possession by the tenant. Edwards did not allege that he was forced to move out of his unit due to the change in the parking policy.

Edwards alleged that the association willfully and in bad faith treated the renter-class substantially different from the owner-class by denying a reasonable accommodation (valet parking services) that would afford him equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. However, the court observed that the parking regulations applied equally to all residents. Whatever the racial composition of the individuals living on the premises, anyone wishing to park his or her car at Lake Terrace was deprived of valet services. The decision to rescind valet parking services affected African American residents in exactly the same way it affected the Caucasian residents. Depriving residents of valet parking would not lead to segregated housing or place a burden on African Americans seeking fair housing.

The court granted Edwards 28 days to file a motion to replead his case to correct the deficiencies outlined above, in lieu of which final judgment would be entered in the association’s favor.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Challenge to Bylaws Amendment Barred After One Year

Godwin v. Bay Point Association Board of Directors, No. CL10-5422, Va. Cir. Ct., Feb. 8, 2011

Association Operations: A Virginia court dismissed a unit owner’s claims that the condominium association violated its governing documents by adopting a bylaws amendment that changed the way insurance premiums were assessed because the claims were time-barred.

Susan Godwin owns a unit in Bay Point condominium in Norfolk, Va. She sued Bay Point Association (association) in 2010, alleging that it breached its governing documents by taking actions in 2006 and 2007 that increased her assessment for insurance premiums. The association filed a motion to dismiss her complaint on the ground that it was time-barred.

In October 2006, the association’s board of directors signed a resolution regarding physical damage and flood insurance. In November 2007, it drafted and signed a bylaw amendment relating to insurance premiums. The association argued that challenging either of these actions was time-barred under the Virginia Condominium Act’s statute of limitations, which provides:

An action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted by the unit owners’ association pursuant to this section may not be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded. Va. Code Ann. §55-79.71(C)

The court concluded that the resolution was not an amendment to the condominium governing documents within the meaning of the act, finding, at most, it represented a statement of the board’s opinion that the bylaws should be amended to revise the way insurance premiums were assessed against the unit owners. In the resolution, the board acknowledged the need to amend the bylaws and stated that the amendment process was lengthy and inconsistent with the budget preparation schedule for the upcoming fiscal year. Because the resolution was not an amendment adopted by the unit owners pursuant to the act, the court found that the act’s statute of limitations did not apply. In contrast, however, the court found that the bylaws amendment was an amendment to the governing documents within the definition contemplated by the act; therefore, the one-year statute of limitations applied.

Godwin argued that because the association violated mandatory procedures for amending the bylaws, the amendment was null and void, and thus, the statute of limitations did not apply. The court pointed out that nothing in the statute suggests that only valid bylaw amendments are subject to the one-year statute of limitations; any amendment, not just valid ones, may be challenged within one year. Therefore, Godwin’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Godwin and the association agreed that an action for breach of fiduciary duty (the legal duty of the board to act in the best interests of the residents) must be filed within two years from the date of breach. Godwin argued that, although the association initially breached its fiduciary duty in 2006 and 2007 “when in bad faith it knowingly and willfully” adopted the resolution and the bylaws amendment, there were renewed breaches when the annual budgets were adopted for 2009 and 2010, which reflected the change made to assessments for insurance premiums.

The court disagreed, finding that any breach of fiduciary duty relating to the change in the insurance premium assessment took place when the association acted in 2006 and 2007 to adopt the resolution and bylaw amendment. The latest of these actions occurred over two years prior to Godwin’s filing suit. Therefore, the claim was time-barred.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Declarant Can Collect Assessment for HOA’s Legal Costs

Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Association v. Bates, No. CL68382, Va. Cir. Ct., Jan. 18, 2012

Assessments/Covenants Enforcement/Developmental Rights: A Virginia court determined that the declarant of a Virginia subdivision was entitled, as the sole Class B member, to levy special assessments for legal expenses incurred by the association.

Richard and Stacey Bates own a lot in Lee’s Crossing subdivision, located in Loudoun County, Va. The Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Association’s (association) board of directors authorized, and the declarant (community developer) approved, special assessments against individual lot owners to fund litigation that involved the association. The lot owners, including the Bates, contested the validity of the board’s action and refused to pay the assessments. They asserted that the assessments were not authorized under the association’s governing documents. The association sued the homeowners to collect the unpaid assessments.

The association’s articles of incorporation provide for an initial board of directors to be composed of three members appointed by the declarant. The declaration, in addition to providing a comprehensive plan for the overall management and governance of the subdivision, delineates two classes of membership in the association: Class A (owners of lots) and Class B (the declarant). Class A members have one vote for each lot that they own, and the Class B member has three votes for each lot that it owns.

The declaration provides that so long as the declarant is the Class B member, it shall set the initial, annual and special assessments for all lots not owned by the declarant, and thereafter the board of directors shall set the assessments for said lots.

The declarant’s Class B membership expired on Jan. 12, 2005. However, by a deed of supplemental declaration dated March 19, 2008, the declarant added a property known as Jackson Heights to the association. In accordance with the declaration, the addition allowed the declarant to revive its Class B membership in the added lots. In the event of the addition of new property, the declaration contains no restriction that would confine the declarant from the right to set assessments.

The second amended and restated declaration of covenants, dated Jan. 10, 2002, expanded the association’s authority to recover special assessments to “fund, in whole or in part, the cost of prosecuting or defending litigation involving the Association, its Board, Directors, or Committees . . .”

Finding that the governing documents did not limit the declarant’s power to appoint the board of directors in the event it acquired additional property, the court determined that the actions taken to recover the special assessments were valid corporate acts of the association.

The court awarded the association a judgment in the the amounts assessed against each individual lot owner.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Sales Agreement Without Property Description Revocable

Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC, Slip Opinion 2012 WL 928157, U.S. Dist. Ct., S. Dist. N.Y., March 19, 2012

Federal Law and Legislation: Condominium unit purchasers were entitled to cancel their sales contracts and recover their deposits because the developer failed to include a recordable description of the units in the contracts.

Aviral and Sangeeta Rai are two of the parities in a group of plaintiffs who purchased condominium units in The Lucida high-rise condominium complex in New York City, which was developed by WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC. Rai sued WB Imico, seeking to cancel his sales contract, alleging the developer had violated the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (act). WB Imico counterclaimed, seeking to retain Rai’s deposit. The developer asserted that Rai breached his contract by refusing to close on the purchase of the unit, and by refusing to pay the purchase price.

WB Imico argued that the act did not apply to urban high-rise condominiums such as The Lucida because units were not “lots” within the meaning of the act. Although the act was created primarily to address dishonest sales tactics relating to undeveloped land, it also refers to “the sale or lease of any lot,” which the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has consistently interpreted to include condominium units. Furthermore, courts have equally applied the statute to condominium sales. In accordance with these interpretations, the trial court concluded that the act applied to The Lucida units.

WB Imico argued that sales of The Lucida units were exempt under the act’s 100-lot exemption, which relieves developments that contain fewer than 100 lots from adhering to the act’s registration and disclosure requirements.

When Rai executed his purchase agreement, he was presented with an offering plan and a property report, both of which stated that The Lucida would contain 110 residential units when completed. However, between April 2007 and February 2008, some purchasers reached agreements with WB Imico to combine their units, reducing the total number of units in the development to 98. The revised floor plans that combined 23 units into 11 units were approved in October 2008, and an amendment reflecting the change in the offering plan was filed with the New York Department of Law.

WB Imico argued that the act has a self-regulatory structure, and a developer may take advantage of a statutory exemption, such as the act’s 100-lot exemption, provided it maintains records demonstrating that the requirements of the exemption are met. However, citing recent case law, the court determined that an ownership transaction’s eligibility for the 100-lot exemption is determined by the number of units the development has at the time a purchaser signs the sales contract. The relevant number of units used for determining exemption eligibility is the number communicated to the buyer at the time of sale, regardless of whether the developer ultimately decrease the number of units to fewer than 100. Because the offering plan provided to Rai indicated The Lucida would contain 110 residential units when complete, the 100-lot exemption did not apply.

The act also provides that a purchase agreement that fails to include a recordable property description “may be revoked by the purchaser within two years from the date of signing.” Rai’s purchase agreement did not provide tax lot information for his unit. Although WB Imico could have obtained tax lot numbers for all The Lucida units in April 2007, it chose not to do so. Because of this, tax lot numbers were not assigned until June 2009, when the first amendment to the condominium declaration was recorded. Accordingly, the court concluded that Rai’s purchase agreement was subject to cancellation.

The court ruled that the act applied to The Lucida condominium units; that the sale of Rai’s unit did not qualify for the 100-lot exemption; and that WB Imico’s failure to include the tax lot number in the purchase agreement constituted a violation of the act that permitted Rai to rescind his agreements and recover his deposit.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Mortgage Lien Superior to Lien for Unpaid Assessments

Riner v. Neumann, No. 05-10-00445-CV, Texas App. Ct., Nov. 16, 2011

Assessments/Covenants Enforcement: A Texas appeals court affirmed a trial court’s judgment that a lien against a condominium unit to secure a mortgage was superior to a lien for unpaid condominium assessments.

In 1989, Jose Lopez purchased a unit in The Cedars Condominium in Dallas, Texas. In 2004, he took out a loan from Novastar Mortgage Inc. and executed a home equity security agreement that granted a first lien on his unit to Novastar. At the time, he was not delinquent on his assessments to The Cedars Association (association).

Lopez defaulted on paying his mortgage and homeowners assessments in 2006. The association held a foreclosure sale on June 6, 2006, and Wade Riner bought the unit for $4,700. Novastar held a foreclosure sale on Aug. 1, 2006, and Gaylon Neumann purchased the unit for $42, 810.

Neumann resided in the unit from Aug. 2, 2006 through September 11, 2006. On Sept. 12, 2006, Riner locked him out of the unit and, without Neumann’s permission, took possession of the unit and removed his property from it.

Neumann sued Riner, seeking title to and possession of the unit, plus damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled in Neumann’s favor, finding that Novastar’s lien, under which Neumann obtained title, was superior to the association’s lien, under which Riner claimed title. Riner appealed.

Riner maintained that the trial court erred by concluding that Novastar’s lien was superior to the association’s lien. The condominium declaration provides that unpaid assessments constitute a lien on the unit that is superior to all other liens except for:

(1) All taxes and special assessments levied by governmental and taxing authorities; and (2) All liens securing sums due or to become due under any prior recorded purchase money mortgage, vendor’s lien or deed of trust.

However, the condominium declaration also provides that the assessment lien “shall attach from the date of the failure of payment of the assessment.” Since Lopez was not delinquent in his assessments to the association at the time the home equity mortgage was recorded, the appeals court concluded that the association’s assessment lien was inferior to Novastar’s mortgage. Accordingly, the trial court properly ruled that Novastar’s lien was superior to the association’s lien for assessments, and the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

©2012 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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