June 2013
In This Issue:
Owner Not Liable For Assessments When Board Wasn’t Established
Association Not Liable for Guest’s Injuries
Exclusive Telecommunications Agreement Violates FCC Rule
Association Must Replace Exterior Patio Doors
Board Must Disclose Books and Records to Owner
Board Must Arbitrate Construction Defect Claims
Board Responsible For Preserving the Declaration
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Owner Not Liable For Assessments When Board Wasn’t Established

Hall v. Town Creek Neighborhood Association, No. A12A1972 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013)

Association Operations: The Georgia Court of Appeals held that a declarant does not have the power of an association board to levy assessments, even though the declarant may have the authority to appoint the board.

Town Creek is a subdivision located in Fulton County, Ga., and is governed by the Town Creek Neighborhood Association (association). The association sued homeowner Danielle Hall for unpaid special assessments. It sought to recover the unpaid assessments as well as attorney’s fees pursuant to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Town Creek (declaration).

The declaration provides that the board has the power to levy special assessments, and the association’s bylaws give the developer the exclusive authority to appoint and remove association directors and officers for a certain period of time (the developer control period). It is undisputed that the developer control period had not expired at the time of the suit.

The association conceded that the developer had never appointed an association board. It maintained, however, that it was common practice for a developer to take on the role as acting board for an association during the developer control period if an official board had yet to be selected. Therefore, the association argued that the assessments were legal even in the absence of a board. The appeals court disagreed.

In interpreting the declaration, the appeals court applied the common law of covenants and viewed the declaration as a contract. Under contract interpretation rules, if the contested language is clear and unambiguous, the court’s job is to apply that language as written.

Neither the declaration nor the bylaws stated that the developer was obligated to appoint the board. However, the documents also did not provide that the developer may act in lieu of the board. Thus, the appeals court determined that the declaration clearly intended a board to be appointed and had plainly contemplated the legal and procedural safeguards that creating a board would provide to the homeowners.

Since the Town Creek developer had never appointed a board, the appeals court held that there was no governing body empowered to levy special assessments. As such, Hall was not obligated to pay the special assessments.

The appeals court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the association.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

 

Association Not Liable for Guest’s Injuries

Juzwicki v. Board of Managers, 1910-1912 Halsted Condominium Association, No. 1-11-0754 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 2013)

Risks and Liabilities: An Illinois appeals court upheld a ruling that a condominium association was not liable for injuries sustained by a unit owner’s guest who was injured falling down an air shaft while walking on an unimproved area of the roof.

Cristina Lawrence resides in 1910-1912 Halstead Condominium. The building contains six units and has a flat blacktop roof surrounded by a short tile-topped wall. The, 1910-1912 Halsted Condominium Association’s (association) board of managers maintains and manages the condominium common area.

Two rooftop decks occupy approximately 40 percent of the roof, one for use by Lawrence’s unit and the other for use by the other third-floor unit, which is owned by Ginger Kroll. The owners constructed the rooftop decks without obtaining building permits from the City of Chicago or permission from the association. The decks are separated by a three-foot railing and surrounded by a continuous 3-1/2-foot tall railing.

The remaining 60 percent of the roof was unimproved and has an air shaft that is approximately five feet across and runs vertically from the roof to the ground. It is surrounded by a one-foot high parapet wall. There is no artificial lighting on either of the rooftop decks or the airshaft.

On September 9, 2000, Keith Juzwicki attended a party in Lawrence’s unit. During the party, guests moved between the unit and the roof deck. Juzwicki climbed over the deck’s railing and onto the unimproved section of the roof. When another guest also attempted to cross over the railing, Juzwicki playfully tried to block him and, during the horseplay, Juzwicki fell into the air shaft, sustaining serious injuries.

Juzwicki sued Lawrence, Kroll and the association for negligence. The trial court dismissed the claim against Kroll, finding that the unimproved roof and air shaft were common elements of the condominium over which she had neither ownership nor control. On the same grounds, the court granted summary judgment (judgment by the court without a trial) to Lawrence. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the association, finding it could not foresee that a unit owner’s guest would jump a fence to go onto the unimproved roof. Juzwicki appealed.

To prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to uphold, that the defendant had breached that duty, and that an injury was caused due to the breach. If it is found that the injuries are the result of negligent property maintenance, the plaintiff has the right to recover damages against the party in control and possession of the neglected premises.

The appeals court found that the trial court had properly dismissed the action against Kroll, and it affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Lawrence since she did not own or control the unimproved section of the roof or the air shaft. However, the appeals court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the association, sending the case back to the trial court for consideration as to whether the association could reasonably foresee that Juzwicki would climb onto the unimproved roof. If the association could have foreseen Juzwicki’s behavior, as the trial court had found to be true, then determining whether the association also should have reasonably foreseen this occurrence was a factual question that should be decided by a jury rather than decided by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment.

Although the trial court heard other arguments, it based its decision solely on its finding that the association could not have reasonably foreseen the occurrence. It never ruled on other arguments  the association raised on appeal, including that Juzwicki was a trespasser on the roof, and, therefore, the association’s only duty was to refrain from injuring him through willful and wanton conduct; that his injuries were caused by an open and obvious condition; and that the association did not engage in willful and wanton conduct. The appeals court remanded the case to the trial court to consider these issues.

On remand, the trial court entertained oral arguments from the parties and concluded that, as a matter of law, Juzwicki was a trespasser at the time of the accident, defining a trespasser as “a person who goes upon the premises of another without express or implied permission or invitation.” The law is also clear that permission to enter one part of a property does not give an invitee access to all areas of the property. Absent willful and wanton conduct, the association was not liable for Juzwicki’s injuries. Willful and wanton conduct involves not only intentional acts, but acts which exhibit a reckless disregard for the safety of others. Because there was no evidence of any prior incidents involving the air shaft, the trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment. Juzwicki again appealed.

The appeals court observed that while initially Juzwicki was an invitee to Lawrence’s unit and its rooftop deck, he lost his status as an invitee once he ventured without invitation onto the unimproved roof. The record showed Juzwicki climbed over a 3-1/2-foot continuous railing through which there was no gate for ingress and egress. He then descended two additional feet from the deck in order to get to an unimproved area of the roof on the other side of the railing, where he “shadow boxed” with another guest before falling into the air shaft. Clearly, Juzwicki deviated from the extent of his invitation.

Accordingly the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Exclusive Telecommunications Agreement Violates FCC Rule

Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Association, Inc. v. OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC, 713 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013)

Federal Law and Legislation: A federal appeals court affirmed a ruling that a series of agreements designed to give a monopoly to a cable service provider were null and void under FCC rules.

In 1992, Congress enacted the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, making it unlawful for a cable operator to engage in “unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the purpose and effect of which is to hinder or prevent” another operator from providing services to consumers. The act authorizes the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe regulations to identify conduct prohibited under the act.

The FCC adopted a rule in 2007 entitled “Exclusivity Order,” which barred operators of “open video systems” (an alternative method for telecommunication companies to use their infrastructure to provide cable-like video service to subscribers) from enforcing or executing any provision in a contract that grants it the exclusive right to provide any video programming service (alone or in combination with other services) to a multiple unit dwelling. Any such exclusivity clauses were declared null and void.

Lansdowne on the Potomac is a subdivision in Loudoun County, Va., containing approximately 2,155 homes. Each homeowner is a member of Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Association, Inc. (association).

The developer of Lansdowne engaged M.C. Dean, Inc. to design and install telecommunications systems in the community. M.C. Dean formed multiple corporate entities, including OpenBand at Lansdowne (collectively, OpenBand), and entered into a series of simultaneous, interlocking contractual arrangements to secure the exclusive right to provide telecommunication services to Lansdowne.

In May 2001 (prior to the adoption of the exclusivity order), the developer granted OpenBand an exclusive easement throughout Lansdowne to construct, operate, maintain and replace infrastructure for video, telephone, internet, data services and other data or media communications (collectively, “utilities”). The easement provides that no one else may administer any utilities within Lansdowne without the written consent of OpenBand. The association was also prohibited from granting an easement to any other party for the purpose of providing utilities within Lansdowne.

In June 2001, the developer further recorded the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Lansdowne on the Potomac (declaration), which expressly recognizes OpenBand’s exclusive easement for access and installation of a private utility and telecommunications system within Lansdowne.

Finally, in July 2001, OpenBand entered into a Telecommunications Service Agreement (TSA) with the association, which contracted OpenBand to provide “platform services” (basic video, phone and internet service) to homeowners as well as optional “premium services.” The TSA prohibited the association from engaging any other utility service providers.

OpenBand purchased video, internet and telephone services from two of its affiliated companies and resold the services to Lansdowne homeowners. OpenBand also separately sold its services to the association for its community center and the association office. No other wire-based provider had infrastructure in Lansdowne to deliver cable service to the development.

After OpenBand began providing the cable service, residents began complaining about the quality of the service. The association investigated alternative providers and discovered that other providers were unwilling to contract with Lansdowne residents due to the exclusive easement granted to OpenBand.

In 2011, the association sued OpenBand in federal court, alleging that the exclusivity provisions in the OpenBand easement, the TSA and the declaration violated the FCC’s exclusivity order. The trial court ruled in the association’s favor and issued an order permanently prohibiting OpenBand from enforcing any video service exclusivity provisions against the association or Lansdowne residents. The court also declared that all such exclusivity provisions were null and void. OpenBand appealed.

On appeal, OpenBand argued that the association lacked standing to bring its suit. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) it has suffered a tangible and imminent injury; (2) the injury is traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) it is likely the injury will be cured by a favorable court decision.

OpenBand first contended that the association hadn’t suffered injury because nothing in the agreements precluded the association from contracting with a competing provider. The appeals court found this argument flawed since the plain agreement terms block other providers from accessing the property to build the infrastructure necessary to deliver cable services.

OpenBand then argued that the mere existence of an exclusivity clause did not give rise to an injury unless it was enforced. However, the appeals court noted that the FCC had in fact found that the very existence of an exclusivity clause poses harm since it denies consumers the benefits of lower prices, more channels and better service.

OpenBand argued that any injury the association may have suffered was not caused by its actions, but rather by the intervening actions of third parties (i.e., the decisions by competing companies to not offer services to Lansdowne). However, the appeals court found this argument ignored the reason why competing companies did not offer services in Lansdowne.

OpenBand maintained that it was “entirely speculative” whether an order from the court nullifying OpenBand’s exclusivity clauses would remedy the association’s injuries since the court could not order an alternative provider to offer services to the association. The record revealed that declaring the exclusivity clauses null and void would indeed be likely to remedy the problem because the county had a franchise agreement with a competing cable company which required the competitor to make cable service available to all county residents, except where a subdivision was subject to an exclusivity arrangement. Therefore, the appeals court found the association had standing to bring suit.

OpenBand also appealed the trial court’s determination that the challenged exclusivity clauses violated the exclusivity order. To be subject to the exclusivity order, OpenBand must qualify as an operator of an “open video system.” The FCC has defined an open video system operator as including any person or entity, or any group of persons or entities, who provide “cable service over an open video system and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such open video system, or otherwise controls or is responsible for the management and operation of such an open video system.”

OpenBand disputed that it provided cable services and stated that it was only a reseller. The appeals court held that OpenBand could not avoid being a video service provider by structuring its operations among several related, interlocking entities in “a kind of elaborate shell game.”

Finally, OpenBand argued that none of the challenged agreements (the TSA, the declaration or the easement) violated the exclusivity order and that the agreements should be evaluated individually, not together. The appeals court found this “sleight of hand” would lead to an illogical approach since the arrangement was designed to preserve precisely the monopoly the FCC sought to prohibit.

The appeals court applied the principle that a series of documents designed to function together may be viewed together as representing the complete agreement of the parties. Considering the declaration, the TSA and the easement together as “the single, intertwining contract that it actually is,” the appeals court concluded that they violated the exclusivity order. Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Editor’s Note: Interestingly, on the same day, the appeals court upheld the dismissal of another Loudoun County association’s claim against OpenBand (Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowners Association, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, Nos. 12-1331, 12-2083). In that case, the association did not adequately plead the facts in its complaint to satisfy the standing requirement. The association did not purchase any cable services from OpenBand for its own benefit and only participated in a legally permissible bulk-billing arrangement with OpenBand for service to its members. Thus, the association was not personally harmed by the exclusivity arrangement. The association also did not properly plead injury to any specific members to proceed in a representational capacity. However, the appeals court ordered that the dismissal was without prejudice, so the association could refile to properly plead its case.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Association Must Replace Exterior Patio Doors

Pahl v. Lexington Riverside Condo Association, No. A12-0967 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013)

Contracts/Covenants Enforcement/Miscellaneous Association Operations: A Minnesota appeals court upheld a determination that a condominium association had breached its contract with a unit owner when it failed to replace her damaged patio doors.

Lexington Riverside Condominium is in Lilydale, Minn. All unit owners are members of Lexington Riverside Condo Association (association).

Each condominium unit has a balcony or patio. All ground-floor patios have exterior glass doors that were installed three years after the original construction to prevent water from entering the patios and seeping into the underground garages. It was originally the association’s policy for owners to be responsible for the maintenance and repair costs associated with the ground-floor patio doors. However, in 2003, the association adopted a policy under which it assumed responsibility for ground-floor patio doors to prevent rainwater from leaking into units.

Ellen Quirk Pahl purchased a ground-floor unit in 2007. Before she closed on the sale, she was given a copy of the association’s declaration, bylaws and  rules and regulations. At closing, Pahl was provided with a resale certificate indicating that the association was primarily responsible for maintaining the exterior ground-floor patio doors.

In 2010, snow and rain entered Pahl’s patio between the patio door and frame. Pahl informed the property manager about the leak and requested that the association replace her exterior patio doors. The association had several contractors inspect the doors to estimate the repair costs; two of the contractors informed Pahl that the doors would need to be replaced to prevent future water leaks.

Rather than pay to replace Pahl’s doors, the association decided to review its policy regarding exterior patio doors. In January 2011, the board of directors adopted a new policy stating that exterior patio doors were now the unit owners’ financial responsibility. Pahl’s request was officially denied in February 2011.

In June 2011, Pahl filed a claim in the Dakota County conciliation court against the association to replace her patio doors and was awarded $7,103.03. The association removed the matter to district court, where a bench trial (trial before a judge without a jury) took place in November. The district court held that the association was liable for the cost of replacing Pahl’s exterior patio doors because when Pahl purchased her unit, she and the association formed a contract that included the declaration, the association’s rules, and, by incorporation, the 2003 policy regarding the association’s responsibility for patio doors. Pursuant to this contract, the association was responsible for repairing or replacing Pahl’s patio doors.

While the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act assigns financial responsibility for limited common elements such as Pahl’s patio doors to the unit owner, it does not apply where, as here, the declaration assigns responsibility differently. The district court concluded that the association breached its contract with Pahl when it failed to replace her patio doors. The association appealed.

The declaration provides that the association is responsible for the maintenance, repair, management and operation of the “Common Area and Facilities.” It also provides that “[e]xterior windows and frames, exterior glass sliding doors and frames and casings are Common Areas and Facilities.” Pahl argued that this unambiguously established that the association was responsible for maintaining her patio doors, which are exterior, glass and sliding. The association argued that the previous sentence of the declaration stating that owners “shall have an exclusive easement with respect to such balcony or patio within the railed-in portion of such balcony or patio,” implies that doors or fixtures attached to the patio are not common areas, but instead are part of the exclusive easement.

The association further argued that because the ground-floor patios did not have exterior doors when the declaration was adopted, patio doors were not intended to fall under the category of “exterior glass sliding doors,” but were included in the definition of “limited common areas.” The declaration does not assign responsibility for limited common areas.

The appeals court found that the association’s arguments were unpersuasive given the declaration’s clear language describing exterior glass doors as common area, for which the declaration assigns financial responsibility to the association. Even if the declaration’s language was ambiguous, the appeals court found that the evidence also overwhelmingly supports this interpretation. The association’s 2003 policy stated that the association was responsible for repairing or replacing the ground-floor patio doors when necessary to prevent water leaks. This policy was referenced in both the resale certificate and the rules and regulations given to Pahl when she purchased the unit.

The district court’s judgment was affirmed.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Board Must Disclose Books and Records to Owner

Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Association, No. 110505 (Ill. Apr. 25, 2013)

State and Local Legislation and Regulation: The Illinois Supreme Court upheld a finding by the appeals court that a Chicago municipal ordinance that authorized unit owners to inspect a condominium association’s books and records within three days of making a written request was a valid exercise of the city’s home rule power.

Gary Palm owns a unit in 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium in Chicago, Ill. He served on the board of directors of 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Association (“association”) from 1992 to 1998.

In 1999, Palm sent a letter to the association asking the board to allow him to review specific documents and records related to the building’s management. When his request was denied, Palm sued the association to gain access to the documents.

Palm sought an order compelling the association to produce the documents under various laws, including a provision of the city’s condominium ordinance. The ordinance allows unit owners to inspect a condominium association’s financial books and records within three days of delivering a written request to the association.

The association claimed at trial that the city ordinance was invalid because it directly conflicts with state statutes addressing the same subject. Those state statutes allow the association a longer time to respond to an owner’s request, require the owner to state a proper purpose for the records request and only require 10 years of records be produced. The trial court ordered the association to produce the material. The association appealed.

The appeals court held that the ordinance authorizing the records inspection was a valid exercise of the city’s home rule power and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Home rule is a concept in which a state constitution or legislative action allocates its power to rule the state’s people and property between state and local governments.) The association appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The association claimed that the city ordinance authorizing owners to inspect an association’s books and records within three days of a written request was invalid because it effectively nullified several important provisions of the state’s condominium and nonprofit corporation acts, both of which govern condominium associations’ duty to maintain and disclose books and records.

The supreme court ruled that the city ordinance provided a valid and enforceable amount of time in which owners could inspect their condominium association’s financial books and records. Contrary to the association’s argument, the conflicting guidelines between the city’s ordinance and the state statutes does not render the ordinance invalid or beyond a municipality’s home rule power. The supreme court held that to limit or restrict home rule authority, the state legislature must do so specifically. Comprehensive legislation that conflicts with a local ordinance is insufficient to limit home rule authority.

The supreme court determined that the problem pertained to local government affairs, and the state legislature had not expressly preempted home rule in the conflicting statutes. Therefore, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s power.

The appeals court judgment was affirmed.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Board Must Arbitrate Construction Defect Claims

Pulte Home Corporation v. Vermillion Homeowners Association, Inc., No. 2D12-1532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013)

Contracts/Developer Liability: A Florida appeals court held that a homeowners association, acting as the agent of all homeowners, was bound to arbitrate construction defect claims under purchase agreements signed by the individual homeowners.

Vermillion subdivision is a residential townhome development in Pasco County, Fla. It is subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions and managed and maintained by Vermillion Homeowners Association, Inc. (association).

Although the townhomes are individually owned by association members, the declaration provides that the association is responsible for maintaining not only the common areas, but also the buildings’ exterior. The association is not required to maintain doors, door frames, glass surfaces or locks.

Pulte Home Corporation built the common areas, roads, drainage ponds, building exteriors, roofs and other improvements in the subdivision. The association sued Pulte for construction defects, alleging it had breached an implied warranty by failing to comply with applicable building codes,  good design, engineering and construction practices. Pulte filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, and Pulte appealed.

The appeals court found that it was impossible to know from the association’s complaint what defects were at issue, although it appeared likely that the primary issues were related to the townhomes’ exterior and roofs. The association filed the suit “in its own right and as lawful and adequate representative of all of the owners of the lots comprising the Association, all of whom are members of the Association.”

Pulte presented evidence that each homeowner had entered into an arbitration agreement with Pulte, affirmed in both the unit purchase agreement and the applicable “Pulte Protection Plan” limited warranty. Thus, it was undisputed that if homeowners brought actions individually against Pulte, they were required individually to arbitrate any claims involving construction defects.

The association argued that it did not execute an arbitration agreement with Pulte, and therefore should be free to litigate its claims. However, the appeals court noted that the association was suing, at least in part, in its representative capacity. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure expressly give a homeowner association standing to bring an action on behalf of its members, including an action addressing the roof or structural components of a building. However, when the association brings an action for damage to a roof or exterior of an individually owned home, its rights are secondary to those of the actual owner. The court concluded that the association essentially was assigned the right to bring the action for its members, with the obligation to comply with the arbitration agreements signed by the members.

The appeals court held that the association could not avoid its obligation to arbitrate construction defects claims by alleging those claims in an ambiguous manner. On the other hand, the association should not be compelled to arbitrate a claim in its own right for those common areas owned by the association simply because the complaint lacked detail.

The appeals court reversed the order denying Pulte’s motion to compel arbitration and found, instead, that Pulte was entitled to enforce its arbitration agreements as to claims arising from the individual homeowners’ contracts with Pulte. However, the appeals court also instructed the trial court to give the association the opportunity to amend its complaint on remand to allege any of its claims that might proceed to litigation while the claims relating to individual townhomes were arbitrated.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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Board Responsible For Preserving the Declaration

Southfields of Palm Beach Polo and Country Club Homeowners Association, Inc. v. McCullough, Nos. 4D11-1130 and 4D11-4659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2013)

Association Operations: The Florida Court of Appeals held that a homeowner association’s declaration required the board to take the necessary action to prevent the declaration from expiring under the Florida Marketable Record Titles to Real Property Act.

Southfields of Palm Beach Polo and Country Club (Southfields) is a subdivision in Wellington, Fla., and is governed by the Southfields of Palm Beach Polo and Country Club Homeowners Association, Inc. (association). Homeowner Victoria McCullough filed a complaint against the association that sought to compel the association’s board of directors to file the appropriate documents to preserve the Declaration of Restrictions of Southfields (declaration).

Under the Florida Marketable Record Titles to Real Property Act (MRTA), covenants or restrictions on the land expire after 30 years; however, a homeowner association may prevent any covenant or restriction from expiring by recording a notice during such 30-year period. McCullough alleged that the board was refusing to file the appropriate documents to prevent the declaration from expiring.

The trial court granted summary judgment (judgment by the court without a trial) to McCullough and ordered the board to file the appropriate notice to preserve the declaration. The association appealed.

The appeals court noted that, while the MRTA did not obligate an association to preserve a declaration, Southfields’ declaration did not give the board the discretion to let the declaration expire. The declaration created a uniform plan for developing and operating Southfields. It also established the association and required the board to exercise its powers to maintain the declaration until such time as 95 percent of the landowners vote to dissolve the declaration and disband the association.

The appeals court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the declaration makes it clear that the board is mandated to—and has a duty to–protect Southfields and the declaration unless the owners vote otherwise.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that ordered the board to take the necessary action to preserve the declaration.

©2013 Community Associations Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction and redistribution by CAI members or nonmembers are strictly prohibited.

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